A reconstrução racional do programa de pesquisa do racionalismo clássico sob a perspectiva da abordagem de solução de problemas.

A tese é de que a concepção de Duhem da ciência antecipa, entre outros elementos, o modelo de escolha de teorias científicas associado com as concepções de Popper, Lakatos e Kuhn. No contexto do seu debate com Poincaré, Duhem propõe um modelo metodológico de escolha racional de teorias formado, também, de componentes extralógicos. O modelo substitui a metodologia bipartida, teoria e natureza, por uma tripartida, confrontação entre duas teorias e natureza. Tal metodologia verifica-se adequada para descrever o processo de escolha (...) de teoria formado das etapas da refutação e rejeição. Ambas as propostas revelam seu enfoque histórico-crítico cuja tese é a interdependência entre história e teoria da ciência. A interdependência configura-se num laboratório para a elaboração, a avaliação e teste das propostas metafísicas e metodológicas para a construção de uma teoria da ciência. (shrink)

O objetivo é propor uma reconstrução racional da concepção da ciência de Duhem, por meio do recurso da metodologia da teoria da ciência, como uma teoria normativa da dinâmica do conhecimento. Essa reconstrução ajuda a estabelecer que Duhem não pode ser classificado como um convencionalista/pragmatista, como sugere a interpretação-padrão, e, além disso, que Duhem almeja construir uma concepção que seja um termo médio entre a concepção metafísica clássica e a concepção do convencionalismo/pragmatismo. A estratégia metodológica para construir esse termo médio (...) é a proposta de um realismo estrutural e convergente. Duhem substitui o sujeito transcendental dos clássicos por uma teoria transcendental a ser alcançada por um processo dinâmico. Using the resources of the methodology of theory of science we propose a rational reconstruction of Duhem's conception of science, interpreting it as a normative theory of the dynamics of knowledge. Such a reconstruction helps to establish that Duhem cannot be classified as a conventionalist/pragmatist as proposed in the standard interpretation, and, furthermore, that Duhem proposes to construct a conception of science as a middle way between a classical metaphysical conception and a conventionalist/pragmatist conception. The methodological strategy for this middle way is the proposal of a structural and convergent realism. Duhem replaces the transcendental subject of the classics with a transcendental theory to be reached by a dynamic process. (shrink)

Résumé — Cet article se propose de montrer que le scepticisme présent dans les œuvres philosophiques de Huet, notamment dans le Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit humain, n’est pas un scepticisme chrétien dans le sens d’un scepticisme déterminé d’une manière ou d’une autre par la doctrine chrétienne. On examine d’abord quelques raisons historiques de la réception de la philosophie du Traité comme un « pyrrhonisme chrétien ». Puis on signale des différences décisives entre le scepticisme du Traité et (...) ses autres formes présentes chez d’autres philosophes de la période, qui peuvent être légitimement qualifiés comme différents modèles de scepticisme chrétien.— The article attempts to show that the skepticism exhibited in Huet’s philosophical works, in particular in the Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit humain, is not a Christian skepticism in the sense of a skepticism determined in one way or another by Christian doctrine. The article begins by examining some historical reasons for the reception of the philosophy of the Traité as a « Christian pyrrhonism ». Then some crucial differences are pointed out between the skepticism of the Traité and other models of skepticism exhibited in the works of other philosophers of the period which can be considered as different types of Christian skepticism. (shrink)

8 March, now known as International Women’s Day, is a day for feminist claims where demonstrations are organized in over 150 countries, with the participation of millions of women all around the world. These demonstrations can be viewed as collective rituals and thus focus attention on the processes that facilitate different psychosocial effects. This work aims to explore the mechanisms involved in participation in the demonstrations of 8 March 2020, collective and ritualized feminist actions, and their correlates associated with personal (...) well-being and collective well-being, collective efficacy and collective growth, and behavioral intention to support the fight for women’s rights. To this end, a cross-cultural study was conducted with the participation of 2,854 people from countries in Latin America and Europe, with a retrospective correlational cross-sectional design and a convenience sample. Participants were divided between demonstration participants and non-demonstrators or followers who monitored participants through the media and social networks. Compared with non-demonstrators and with males, female and non-binary gender respondents had greater scores in mechanisms and criterion variables. Further random-effects model meta-analyses revealed that the perceived emotional synchrony was consistently associated with more proximal mechanisms, as well as with criterion variables. Finally, sequential moderation analyses showed that proposed mechanisms successfully mediated the effects of participation on every criterion variable. These results indicate that participation in 8M marches and demonstrations can be analyzed through the literature on collective rituals. As such, collective participation implies positive outcomes both individually and collectively, which are further reinforced through key psychological mechanisms, in line with a Durkheimian approach to collective rituals. (shrink)

O presente trabalho analisa o programaético de santo Antônio no que se refere aomodo de vida do clero regular. O texto básico é odos 'Sermones dominicales' e dos 'Sermonesfestivi'. Neles percebe-se que, para o santo.oclero secular, o clero regular, os leigos e a 'SocietasChristiana' precisavam de uma reforma doscostumes, de acordo com a reforma pastoral,moral e religiosa proposta pelo N Concilio deLatrão para toda a Cristandade, e implementadapelos papas Honório III e Gregório IX,tendo como agentes pastorais os dominicanos eos franciscanos.

It can be stated that self-regulated learning (SRL) brings broad benefits to the process of students' learning and studying. However, research has yet to be undertaken in relation to one of its components, namely self-regulation of motivation and affectivity. The main objectives of this study are to examine the use of self-motivation strategies that involve classmates and to obtain models on the influence of academic goals and self-efficacy on such self-motivation strategies. To this end, was conducted a study using two (...) different samples of students in the compulsory secondary education or baccalaureate stages in Spain (N = 613 and N = 910). The results obtained indicate that, with regard to gender, differences only exist in the use of the strategy of deception (t = 5.450, p <.001, d =.364). That the two pairs of strategies positively and significantly correlated with one another (r =.239, p <.01 and r =.355, p <.01). That only the strategy of annulation of others correlates with a more adaptive type of motivation. Thus, the group of students that reported the greatest level in its use also did so in relation to task and ego self-enhancing goals, to self-efficacy, and being negatively associated with the goal of work avoidance. Finally, were offered models on relationships between academic goals, self-efficacy and enhancement and annulation strategies (χ² (8) = 5.204, p =.736) and deception and annulation strategies (χ² (4) = 3.228, p =.520). (shrink)

Uscatescu, J. El tema de la Ilustración.--Flórez, R. La Ilustración y la comprensión de la historia.--González Alvarez, A. La Ilustración y el fenómeno religioso.--Merino, J. A. El hombre en Rousseau.--Mauzi, R. El problema religioso en la Nueva Eloísa.

Neste artigo examina-se a situação dos NMRs. Utilizando dados da sua crescente proliferação na África, apresentam-se vários modelos teóricos, numa tentativa de elucidar o seu desenvolvimento. Dá-se uma atenção particular à questão de saber se esses modelos teóricos são culturalmente condicionados e são suficientes para uma compreensão global dos NMRs. /// Cet article examine la situation des Nouveaux Mouvements religieux. Utilisant des données de leur croissante prolifération en Afrique, l'auteur présente plusieurs modèles en un essai d'élucidation de leur développement. Il (...) fait particulièrement attention à la question de savoir sices modèles théoriques sont culturellement conditionnés et suffisants pour une compréhension globale des N.M.R. /// This article examines the situation of NMRs. Taking as example the development of NMRs in Africa, the author considers the contribution of various theoretical models, specifically deprivation, revitalisation and brainwashing theories. Particular attention is given to the question whether or not these models are culture specific and/or to whether or not they are applicable to the present development of NMRs. (shrink)

El autor interpreta el pragmatismo defendido por R. Rorty como una variante más del cambio cultural denominado "Postmodernidad ", e identifica y comenta algunas afirmaciones rortianas sobre el sentido de la filosofia y el pensamiento crítico que le permitan encarar los temores expresados por J. Searle sobre el posible irracionalismo ofrecido por los posmodernos en el campo de la educación. A fin de establecer un marco conceptual lo suficientemente amplio para desarrollar su tesis, el autor confronta dos de las múltiples (...) distinciones ofrecidas sobre el sentido de la "postmodernidad" para criticar la epistemología como núcleo de las tareas de la modernidad occidental. Establecido dicho marco se da paso a algunas de las tesis de Rorty sobre el sentido que toman en su propuesta los conceptos de filosofia, razón y educación. Desde este punto de vista, la educación se convierte en una genuina actividad ética y no en una nueva destreza metodológica propia de la educación liberal ilustrada tal como la defiende Searle. Otra tesis complementaria del autor es que la posmodernidad no es el reino del relativismo ni la sinrazón. (shrink)

La obra al-D_aji-ra al-saniyya fi- ta�ri-j aldawla al-mari-niyya, que aborda la historia de los Banu- Mari-n, incluye una serie de noticias referentes a otras tierras de la Da-r al-Islam, como Egipto, Siria o al-Andalus. La autoría de la misma no ha sido determinada, por lo que señalaremos las noticias más destacadas sobre este asunto. De la información que ofrece esta obra acerca de al-Andalus, este artículo se centra en el análisis de los fragmentos relativos a los territorios conquistados por Castilla (...) durante el s. XIII, que no había sido aprovechada hasta el momento, y que contribuye a ampliar nuestro conocimiento acerca de este período histórico, muy especialmente por lo que respecta a la suerte que corrieron las poblaciones musulmanas y a la cronología de la conquista. Abordamos las actitudes adoptadas por los dirigentes políticos de al-Andalus y el Magreb, ante el avance de los cristianos, desde la resistencia hasta la conversión, y la importancia que este grupo concedió a las luchas contra los cristianos, que fueron un elemento de legitimación del poder político de los Banu- Mari-n, objetivo destacado del autor de la obra. (shrink)

Th e a r ticl e e xplore s h o w globalizatio n i s assumin g a pr o g ress i v e emptyin g o f the s o v ereignt y o f natio n state s i n economic , political , institutional , social , cultura l an d l e gal aspects . Th e traditiona l l e ga l institution s ar e increasing ly g i vin g ris e (...) t o n ew non-stat e re- gulato r y source s (supranational , pr iv ate , technica l an d communitarian) . Th e resul t o f this po l ycentri c r e gulato r y compl e x i s th e co e xistenc e o f a d i v ersit y o f no r mat i v e order s and jurisdiction s i n v olvin g th e e xhaustio n o f th e l e ga l paradig m aroun d w hic h th e Stat e has st r ucture d it s institutions. (shrink)

Voici une dition qui contribuera sans doute clairer une activit encore mal connue de Voltaire, celle d' diteur. Car de cette uvre composite qu'est le Discours de l'empereur Julien Voltaire se veut avant tout et reste bien l'organisateur, empruntant l'empereur du IVe si cle le r quisitoire qu'il a dress dans son Contre les Galil ens et au marquis d'Argens, son moderne et premier traducteur, la 'belle infid le' qu'il a donn e lire cinq ans plus t t ceux qui (...) n'entendaient ni le grec ni le latin. Voltaire n'a cependant conserv le joyau que pour le servir dans une monture toute nouvelle: d'Argens avait accompagn sa traduction d'une substantielle pr face et d'une annotation abondante; mais Voltaire a cart la premi re et retenu un tiers seulement de la seconde, encadrant d sormais le Discours de ses propres textes; en pr faces un 'Avis au lecteur' suivi d'un 'Portrait de l'empereur Julien' et d'un 'Examen du Discours'; en postface un virulent 'Suppl ment au Discours'. A quoi l'on ajoutera les quarante-quatre notes r dig es par l' diteur et qui s'adjoignent aux treize notes de d'Argens qu'il a conserv es; ce sont les 'nouvelles notes de divers auteurs' annonc s par la page de titre et dont quatre sont sign es Damilaville, Boulanger, Bolingbroke et 'le th ologien Th ro': sous ces noms d'emprunt, l' diteur ne s'est pas fait scrupule de r utiliser certains de ses textes ant rieurs, pas plus qu'il n'a craint, par de simples coupes habilement op r es dans certaines notes de d'Argens, de d figurer l'occasion la pens e du marquis quand elle se trouve contraire la sienne. Ainsi voit-on clairer sous ses diff rents aspects une activit ditoriale dont il fallait aussi p n trer les motifs. (shrink)

I present two criticisms: (1) Merge is a model of performance in speech perception experiments but not an ecologically valid model integrating both word recognition and speech perception, and (2) Merge's implementation of the variability of lexical effects must be made more precise or the model is indistinguishable from its alternatives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the (...) Pyrrhonian doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

The purpose of this brief paper is to show that the primary problem of technology, like all problems related to possibilities and actions, is the conceptualiadequacyof the intentions and values it implies, and not, as many critics have suggested, its social effects. Presupposed for this statement and evaluation is an interpretation of experience called here experiential idealism. On the basis of this position some suggestions are made about the meaning of technology and its correlative possibilities and constraints.

This paper addresses the doubts voiced by Wigner about the physical relevance of the concept of geometrical points by exploiting some facts known to all but honored by none: Almost all real numbers are transcendental; the explicit representation of any one will require an infinite amount of physical resources. An instrument devised to measure a continuous real variable will need a continuum of internal states to achieve perfect resolution. Consequently, a laboratory instrument for measuring a continuous variable in a finite (...) time can report only a finite number of values, each of which is constrained to be a rational number. It does not matter whether the variable is classical or quantum-mechanical. Now, in von Neumann’s measurement theory (von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, [1955]), an operator A with a continuous spectrum—which has no eigenvectors—cannot be measured, but it can be approximated by operators with discrete spectra which are measurable. The measurable approximant F(A) is not canonically determined; it has to be chosen by the experimentalist. It is argued that this operator can always be chosen in such a way that Sewell’s results (Sewell in Rep. Math. Phys. 56: 271, [2005]; Sewell, Lecture given at the J.T. Lewis Memorial Conference, Dublin, [2005]) on the measurement of a hermitian operator on a finite-dimensional vector space (described in Sect. 3.2) constitute an adequate resolution of the measurement problem in this theory. From this follows our major conclusion, which is that the notion of a geometrical point is as meaningful in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as it is in classical physics. It is necessary to be sensitive to the fact that there is a gap between theoretical and experimental physics, which reveals itself tellingly as an error inherent in the measurement of a continuous variable. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.